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Abstract 
Following a suggestion of Warren Weaver, we extend the Shannon model of communication 
piecemeal into a complex systems model in which communication is differentiated both 
vertically and horizontally. This model enables us to bridge the divide between Niklas 
Luhmann’s theory of the self-organization of meaning in communications and empirical research 
using information theory. First, we distinguish between communication relations and correlations 
between patterns of relations. The correlations span a vector space in which relations are 
positioned and thus provided with meaning. Second, positions provide reflexive perspectives. 
Whereas the different meanings are integrated locally, each instantiation opens horizons of 
meaning that can be codified along eigenvectors of the communication matrix. The next-order 
specification of codified meaning can generate redundancies (as feedback on the forward arrow 
of entropy production). The horizontal differentiation among the codes of communication 
enables us to quantify the creation of new options as mutual redundancy. Increases in 
redundancy can then be measured as local reduction of prevailing uncertainty (in bits). The 
generation of options can also be considered as a hallmark of the knowledge-based economy: 
new knowledge provides new options. Both the communication-theoretical and the operational 
(information-theoretical) perspectives can thus be further developed.  
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Introduction 
 
In his contribution to Shannon & Weaver’s (1949) The Mathematical Theory of Communication, 
Warren Weaver stated (at p. 27) that “[t]he concept of information developed in this theory at 
first seems disappointing and bizarre—disappointing because it has nothing to do with meaning 
…” However, the author added that Shannon’s “analysis has so penetratingly cleared the air that 
one is now, perhaps for the first time, ready for a real theory of meaning.” However, Luhmann 
([1984] 1995) argued that meaning (“Sinn”) self-organizes in terms of communications among 
human beings. From this perspective meaning is generated in interactions among 
communications. As Luhmann (1996, at p. 261) formulated provocatively: “My argument is: it is 
not human beings who can communicate, rather, only communication can communicate.” 
 
Hitherto, Luhmann’s theory has remained far from operationalization and measurement. Using 
Bateson’s (1972, at p. 315) alternative definition of information as “a difference which makes a 
difference” (cf. MacKay, 1969), Luhmann (1984, pp. 102 ff.; 1995, pp. 67f.) defined information 
as implying a selection: a difference can only make a difference for a system of reference that 
selects this difference from among other possible differences. Others have also defined 
information with reference to a receiving system (e.g., an observer) for whom a difference can 
make a difference. Varela (1979, p. 266) argued that the word “information” is derived from “in-
formare” and thus the semantics call for the specification of a system of reference. 
“Information,” however, is then considered a substantive concept that varies with the system of 
reference instead of a formal measure of the uncertainty prevailing in a distribution. Kauffman et 
al. (2008, at p. 28), for example, defined information as “natural selection assembling the very 
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constraints on the release of energy that then constitutes work and the propagation of 
organization.” In summary, using Bateson’s alternative definition of information, the meaning of 
“information” becomes dependent on the context. 
 
Using the same word (“information”) for different concepts has led to considerable confusion. In 
an assessment of this confusion, Hayles (1990, pp. 59f.) compared the discussion with asking 
whether a glass is half empty or half full. However, the semantic confusion can be avoided by 
using the words “uncertainty” or “probabilistic entropy” when Shannon-type information is 
meant. In our opinion, the advantage of measuring uncertainty—and redundancies, as we shall 
argue—in bits of information cannot be underestimated, since the operationalization and the 
measurement provide avenues to hypothesis testing and thus control of the theorizing (Theil, 
1972). Whereas Shannon-type information cannot be specified in terms of Bateson’s definition, 
“a difference which makes a difference” can sometimes be operationalized and measured in 
terms of (potentially negative) bits of information. 
 
Can Luhmann’s theory of meaning and the self-organization of communication also be made 
compatible with Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication? Is it possible to specify how 
information and meaning are related, and why the recursivity of this relation in terms of 
differences which make a difference can lead to the self-organization of meaning from 
communication? In this study, we aim to contribute to bridging this gap between a focus on 
meaning versus uncertainty by decomposing the problem using Herbert Simon’s (1973a) model 
of complex systems that are both vertically and horizontally differentiated, as follows:  
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1. In the vertical dimension, we will follow Luhmann’s (e.g., 1975; 2000) distinction between 
(i) interactions among communications providing variation, (ii) the organization of meanings 
in historical instantiations, and (iii) the self-organization of reflexive meaning generating a 
next level of “horizons of meaning” as global systems of reference (Husserl, 1929; cf. 
Luhmann, 1995b). We argue that the construction in terms of layers is bottom-up from the 
(probabilistic) informational level, but that the emerging systems levels can be expected to 
take over control in terms of codified intentionalities and expectations.  
 
For example, a scholarly communication (e.g., a manuscript) can be expected to contain a 
knowledge claim. Knowledge claims provide in this case the historical variation. When the 
manuscript is submitted, an editorial process is instantiated in which referee comments, 
editorial judgments, etc., are combined. The referees, however, are expected to judge the 
manuscript in terms according with the standards of the field. These codes of the 
communication can be expected to control the process. The instantiation requires a reflexive 
de- and reconstruction of the code.  
 
Unlike Simon’s model (of complex and artificial systems), these mental constructs—codes of 
communication—can operate as a next-order systems level with frequencies much higher 
than the underlying levels. The mental constructs have two sides: the one of the constructing 
agency (in history), and the resulting constructs themselves which can only be entertained 
reflexively. Consequently, the sharing of meanings is volatile and cannot be observed 
directly; but the expectations about this operation can be specified mathematically. On the 
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basis of this specification, one is able to identify and measure the “footprints” of the self-
organizing dynamics in historical instantiations.  
 
In other words, intentions and intentional systems cannot be found as observables in res 
extensa—or “matter”—but can only be hypothesized reflexively in res cogitans—”thought” 
(Husserl, 1929; Luhmann, 1990). The consequent possibility of an inversion in the order of 
control from the material conditions to systems of expectations enables reflexive agents—
human beings—to operate infra-reflexively across (vertical) levels and among (horizontal) 
compartments by changing their respective perspectives on the complexity (Latour, 1988; cf. 
Pickering, 1992).  
 
2. In the horizontal direction, we follow Parsons’ (1968) proposal to consider the functional 
differentiation and symbolic generalization of the codes of communication as drivers of the 
increasing complexity in cultural evolution. Recalling another intuition of Herbert Simon, 
one can expect an alphabet of these codes (Simon, 1973, at pp. 19 ff.); for example, power, 
love, truth, law, art, etc. Because of the various codes operating, the same communication 
can mean something quite different in terms of its affective value, its truth value, or how 
power is reproduced in communications (Parsons, 1963a and b; 1968; Künzler, 1987; 
Luhmann, 1974; 1997). The complexity is increased because the codes can be recombined in 
their instantiations (Hoffmeyer & Emmeche, 1991).  
 
Using the symbolically generalized codes of communication in scholarly discourse, for 
example, one is specifically able to code possible meanings in terms of models that can serve 
6 
to predict future states. The consequent availability of representations of future states 
enhances the anticipatory capacities of the social system of communications to such an extent 
that it can be considered “strongly anticipatory” (Dubois, 2003): anticipations can be used for 
the reconstruction of the system by the system itself. Based on decoding and recoding from 
and into communications, for example, different and highly codified meanings can be 
recombined into new technological options (Arthur, 2009; Cowan & Foray, 1997). A 
technological evolution can thus be generated as the retention mechanism of cultural 
evolution. Because of this coupling between the cultural and technological evolutions, 
Icarus’s dream of flying can nowadays be realized by booking a flight on the internet. 
 
The generation of meaning from (Shannon-type) information 
 
How can the processing of meaning be conceptualized by elaborating on Shannon’s theory given 
the author’s explicit statement that the “semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the 
engineering problem” (Shannon, 1948, at p. 3)? As a first step in the specification of the 
relevance of Shannon’s engineering model for developing a theory of meaning, Weaver (1949, at 
p. 26) proposed two “minor additions” to Shannon’s well-known diagram (Figure 1), as follows:  
 
“One can imagine, as an addition to the diagram, another box labeled “Semantic Receiver” 
interposed between the engineering receiver (which changes signals to messages) and the 
destination. This semantic receiver subjects the message to a second decoding, the demand 
on this one being that it must match the statistical semantic characteristics of the message to 
the statistical semantic capacities of the totality of receivers, or of that subset of receivers 
which constitute the audience one wishes to affect.  
Similarly one can imagine another box in the diagram which, inserted between the 
information source and the transmitter, would be labeled “semantic noise,” the box 
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previously labeled as simply “noise” now being labeled “engineering noise.” From this 
source is imposed into the signal the perturbations or distortions of meaning which are not 
intended by the source but which inescapably affect the destination. And the problem of 
semantic decoding must take this semantic noise into account.”  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Weaver’s (1949) “minor” additions penciled into Shannon’s (1948) original diagram. 
 
Since the “semantic receiver” recodes the information in the messages (received from the 
“engineering receiver” who only changes signals into messages) while having to assume the 
possibility of “semantic noise,” a semantic relationship between the two new boxes can be 
envisaged. Given Shannon’s framework, however, this relation cannot be another 
information transfer—since semantics are defined as external to Shannon’s engineering 
model. Meanings, however, can be shared without observable communications since 
semantics are based on patterns of relations or, in other words, correlations. The correlations 
span a vector space in a topology different from the network space—a graph—of relations.  
 
SEMANTIC 
NOISE 
SEMANTIC 
RECEIVER 
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Two synonyms, for example, can have the same position and meaning in the vector space, 
yet never co-occur in a single sentence as a relation. Similarly, two competing firms may 
have highly correlating patterns of relations with clients, but no relation with each other. In 
the case of a single relation, the relational distance is not different from the correlational 
one; but in the case of relations involving three (or more) agents, the distances in the vector 
space are different from the Euclidean distances in the network. Simmel (in 1902) noted that 
the transition from a group of two to three is qualitative. In a triplet {A, B, C}, the 
instantiation of AC or AB can make a difference with reference to the system of relations.  
 
A system of relations can also be considered as a semantic domain. In other words, the 
sender and receiver are related in the graph of Figure 1, while they are correlated in terms of 
not (yet) necessarily instantiated relations in the background. The sender and receiver, for 
example, may share a (proto-)language. Note that this “language” is still naturalistic to the 
extent that one can also consider the gestures among monkeys as “languaging” (Maturana, 
1978). The virtual structure of correlations provides a latent background that provides 
meaning to the information exchanges in relations. The correlations add up to a vector space 
that is a representation different from the network space, but no Shannon-information has to 
be added! In other words, meaning is not added to the information, but the same information 
is delineated differently and can be considered from a different perspective.  
 
When one considers (Shannon-type) information as a set of differences in a probability 
distribution, “the differences make a difference” for a set of differences, or in other words, a 
system of reference. The systems perspective on the set generates meaning from the 
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interactions among the relational communications. Note that such a “system of differences” 
is not delineated naturally, but remains an analytical construct. Depending on how one 
delineates in time and space, the meanings can be composed differently. Luhmann (1990) 
followed Von Foerster’s (1979; cf. 1993) conjecture to use eigenvector analysis of the 
matrix of communications for its decomposition.
1
 As against Shannon-type information 
which flows linearly along a vector—from the sender to the receiver—one can expect 
meanings to loop and by looping to develop next-order dimensionalities (Krippendorff, 
2009a and b). 
 
The third and fourth dimensions of the probabilistic entropy 
 
As noted, a matrix of communications is shaped as soon as one adds a second 
communication to the single vector in Figure 1. The communication matrix can also be 
considered as a two-dimensional probability distribution—different from the one-
dimensional probability distribution in a vector. Since the operation of a “difference which 
makes a difference” for a set of communications is recursive, further extensions to more 
than two dimensions are also possible.  
 
Whether one’s perspective is extended by taking more dimensions into account depends on 
one’s research question: new types of analysis become possible with increasing 
dimensionality (Table 1), but by Occam’s razor the representation should not be made more 
complex than necessary for the systems under study. Thus, there may be a trade-off in 
                                                 
1
 Luhmann indicates the latent dimensions with the word “eigenvalue” (Luhmann, 1990, p. 113, n. 59; cf. Von 
Glasersfeld, 2008, p. 64, n. 4). Technically, the eigenvalue of an eigenvector is the factor by which the eigenvector 
is scaled when multiplied by the matrix.  
10 
empirical research in terms of requisite variety (Ashby, 1958) and parsimony. However, we 
first pursue the analysis here mathematically,
2
 in order to further specify the expected 
operation of a system of intentionality that cannot be observed directly (Luhmann, 1984, at 
p. 226; 1995, at p. 164). The historically observable instantiations are less complex than the 
evolutionary system which is instantiated; but the hypothesized systems and their respective 
selection mechanisms have the status of hypotheses. The observable instantiations can serve 
us in guiding our imagination of alternatives (Leydesdorff, 2015, in press). 
 
When the communication matrix, for example, is repeated over time, one obtains a three-
dimensional array of information (Figure 2a). In such a three-dimensional array, the 
development of information can also be considered in terms of trajectories; the information 
is then organized historically. A four-dimensional array or hyper-cube of information is 
more difficult to imagine or represent graphically: unlike a (three-dimensional) trajectory, a 
four-dimensional array can contain a regime (Dosi, 1982).  
 
For example, one can consider this next-order system as having one more degree of freedom 
that allows it to select among the possible trajectories in three dimensions as representations 
of its past (Figure 2b). This additional selection implies a reflection by the system. The 
reflection is performative in the present and can therefore be considered as the self-
organization of an adaptive system. In the four-dimensional representational system, one 
representation of its history in three dimensions can be acknowledged (weighted) more than 
another.  
                                                 
2
 “Mathematically” means in this context without reference to material substance (Heidegger, 1962). 
11 
t = t 
t – tn 
t – tm 
 
 
Figure 2a (left) and 2b (right): A three-dimensional array of information can contain a trajectory; a four-dimensional hypercube 
contains one more degree of freedom and thus a variety of possible trajectories. Source: Leydesdorff (1996), p. 289. 
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 first 
dimension 
second  
dimension 
third 
dimension 
fourth  
dimension 
Operation variation 
  
selection 
  
stabilization, retention globalization and self-
organization 
Nature entropy; disturbance extension; network localized trajectory identity or regime 
Character of 
operation 
probabilistic; 
uncertain 
deterministic; 
structural 
reflexive; 
reconstructive 
globally organized; 
resilient 
Appearance instantaneous and 
volatile 
spatial; 
multi-variate 
historically contingent emerging  
hyper-cycle 
Unit of analysis change in terms of 
relations 
latent 
positions 
stabilities during 
history 
virtual expectations 
Type  of analysis descriptive registration multi-variate 
analysis 
time-series analysis non-linear dynamics 
Table 1: Organization of concepts in relation to degrees of freedom in the probability distribution. Source: Leydesdorff (1994), at 
p. 223.   
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We ourselves as psychologies can be considered as self-organizing systems with the 
reflexive capacity to reconstruct the possible representations of our history. Luhmann’s 
(e.g., 1986) suggestion is to model the social system of communications as a system without 
psychological consciousness, but with an equal level of complexity. However, a 
psychological system is centered on the individuum and will therefore tend to integration 
(Haken & Portugali, 2014), whereas the communication system is distributed (as a 
dividuum) and has the option of exploiting additional degrees of freedom for differentiation. 
When communication is centered, a high culture (e.g., the Holy Roman Empire) is shaped as 
a cosmological order with a king, an emperor, or a priest at the top of an integrating 
hierarchy. However, a modern society is based on prevailing differentiation among various 
codes of communication, so that a set of juxtaposed coordination mechanisms can be used. 
The different coordination mechanisms are partially integrated when the systems are 
instantiated in terms of historical organization and action. 
 
Table 1 provides an overview of the semantics associated with different dimensions of the 
probabilistic entropy. Note that the terminology is fluid and not mutually exclusive because 
a two- or higher-dimensional array can also be considered as containing uncertainty (in the 
first dimension). Uncertainty provides the variation that is recursively selected: some 
selections are selected for stabilization (along the time axis), and some stabilizations can be 
selected for globalization of the expectations. The recursion of structures shaped by the 
interactions among the communications leads to interactions among structures providing 
second-order variations. For next-order or next-moment selections, however, the historical 
origin of the variation is irrelevant. Thus, the system may continuously loop into itself at 
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different levels and from different perspectives. The horizontal and vertical differentiations 
lead historically (“phenotypically”) to developments along diagonals. The systems under 
study may be far less decomposable than we envisage in the analytical model.  
 
Levels B and C in the Shannon diagram 
 
Weaver (1949, p. 24) suggested taking Shannon’s original diagram as a representation of 
“level A” which should be complemented with more levels (B and C) that represent how 
meaning is conveyed at level B, and how and why the received meaning can affect behavior 
(at level C)? In our opinion, meaning can only be conducive if it is codified and operates at 
the level of the social (that is, inter-personally); for example, as legislation. Thus, we have 
to look more carefully into the development and functions of codes in inter-human 
communication. 
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Figure 3: Levels B and C added to the Shannon diagram (in red-brown and dark-blue, 
respectively). 
 
Figure 3 provides the scheme that we propose for levels B and C. We specified in the previous 
section that the semantic and potentially linguistic relation between the semantic receiver and 
semantic noise is based on correlations among sets of relations at level A. In the vector space 
(level B), meanings can be shared, but not communicated (because otherwise one operates at 
level A). The use of language facilitates, supports, and potentially reinforces the options for 
sharing meaning. Unlike the primitive forms of language discussed above, human language 
enables us to explicate the meaning of the communication in messages that can also be sent over 
telephone lines (as Shannon-type information at level A). 
 Translations and 
Reconstructions 
SEMANTIC 
NOISE 
SEMANTIC 
RECEIVER 
CORRELATIONS; 
LANGUAGE 
Generalized Code of 
Communication II 
Generalized Code of 
Communication I 
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Natural languages can be considered as the as yet undifferentiated and therefore common 
medium of communication. But, as Talleyrand noted, “La parole a été donnée à l’homme pour 
déguiser sa pensée.”6 In other words, codes of communication are also used at the symbolic level 
for regulating the use of language. The codes enable us to short cut the communication; for 
example, by paying the market price of a good instead of negotiating it using language. In our 
opinion, the codes of communication are thus candidates for Weaver’s level C: the codes and 
their combinations also enable us to make the communications far more precise and efficient 
than is possible in natural languages.   
 
The next-order loop of level C has been discussed in the social sciences as emerging from the so-
called “double contingency” in inter-human communications. Building on American pragmatists 
(Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934), the sociologist Talcott Parsons specified this double contingency as 
follows: in addition to relating to each other, one (Ego) expects the other (Alter) to entertain 
expectations about the other and about possible interactions just as one entertains such 
expectations oneself (Parsons, 1951 and 1968; Parsons & Shils, 1951). Thus, both the network 
space and the vector space are implicated in each inter-human interaction; and beyond being 
positioned, one can change the horizons of meaning emerging in one’s communications by 
changing and refining (positional) perspectives reflexively.  
 
Furthermore, Parsons (1968, p. 440) specified a sociological appreciation of level C as follows:  
 
                                                 
6
 “Speech was given to man to disguise his thoughts.” Retrieved from 
http://forum.quoteland.com/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/99191541/m/251100355 (June 28, 2015); (cf. Voltaire, 1763). 
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“At the cultural level [language] is clearly the fundamental matrix of the whole system of 
media. Large-scale social systems, however, contain more specialized media (if you will, 
specialized “languages”), such as money, power, and influence (see Parsons 1963a; 1963b). 
Such media, like language, control behavior in the processes of interaction.” 
 
Parsons (1963a and b; 1968) described these media as symbolically generalized. Specific codes 
of communication can generate symbolically generalized media of communication (Distin, 
2012). Using these same notions, Luhmann (1994, pp. 194 ff.) further argued that these 
generalized codes would have to be binary—like true and false in logics—in order to be binding. 
In our opinion, the already noted intuition is more fruitful given that eigenvectors of the 
communication matrix (or in higher-order communication arrays) span orthogonally and thus 
induce functional differentiation among the codes. The codes can also be more complex than 
one-dimensional (cf. Hoffmeyer & Emmeche, 1991).  
 
For example, in the case of the science system, Luhmann (1990) argued for true/not-true as the 
specific code that provides a binary criterion for quality control in scholarly discourse. However, 
in the empirical sciences, the truth of statements is not unambiguous: some statements can be 
more true than others. As the sciences develop as discursive networks, uncertainty is always 
present. In a study of the debates about oxidative phosphorylation—which led to the Nobel Price 
of Chemistry for Peter Mitchell in 1978—Gilbert & Mulkay (1984) found that statements were 
relabeled using different repertoires when they were considered true or erroneous from the 
perspective of hindsight. 
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In a number of studies, Herbert Simon (e.g., 1973b) argued in favor of truth-finding and puzzle-
solving as combined “logics” in scientific discovery. In our opinion, also this operationalization 
has also remained chiefly a philosophical appreciation of the evolutionary process (cf. Popper, 
1959 [1935]) more than a proposal for empirical operationalization (cf. Newell & Simon, 1972). 
Empirically, the sciences evolve as systems of expectations rationalized by arguments in 
discourses; after a further development, the criteria may also have changed (Fujigaki, 1997; 
Kuhn, 1962). Using the conceptualization of the codes as evolving eigenvectors of the 
communication matrix, one can appreciate the dynamic and uncertain character of these codes of 
communications.  
 
Codes can also be nested. For example, different specialties may operate with different codes 
while sharing some general criteria for the quality control of scientific communications. 
Similarly, in economic transactions, a variety of payment methods can be distinguished under the 
umbrella of an economic logic that differs from a scholarly or normative one (Boudon, 1979; 
Bourdieu, 1976). In his last book, Bourdieu (2004, at p. 83) precisely formulated a reflection on 
the empirical study of the sciences, as follows:  
 
Each field (discipline) is the site of a specific legality (a nomos), a product of history, which 
is embodied in the objective regularities of the functioning of the field and, more precisely, 
in the mechanisms governing the circulation of information, in the logic of the allocation of 
rewards, etc., and in the scientific habitus produced by the field, which are the condition of 
the functioning of the field. […]  
What are called epistemic criteria are the formalization of the ‘rules of the game’ 
that have to be observed in the field, that is, of the sociological rules of interactions within 
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the field, in particular, rules of argumentation or norms of communication. Argumentation is 
a collective process performed before an audience and subject to rules.  
 
Bourdieu (at p. 78) calls this a “Kantian”—that is, transcendental—transition from “objectivity” 
to “intersubjectivity” as the carrying ground of scientific inferences. However, the philosopher 
most associated with this transition is Edmund Husserl, who criticized the increasingly empiristic 
self-understanding of the modern (European) sciences (Husserl, [1935/36] 1962).  
 
In his Cartesian Meditations, Husserl (1929, at pp. 182f. ) argues that a radical continuation of 
Descartes’ (1637) reasoning is needed for developing a philosophy of science: in addition to the 
cogitantes—that is, the reflexive agents who remain in doubt—one can entertain cogitata—that 
is, things about which we remain in doubt, such as intentions and expectations.
7
 Both the res 
cogitans and the res extensa belong to our reality. According to Husserl, the possibility to 
communicate expectations intersubjectively grounds the empirical sciences “in a concrete theory 
of science” (p. 155).  
 
In our opinion, indeed one tests expectations entertained at the supra-individual level (in 
discourses) against observations, and the observations can update these expectations since they 
can function as arguments. We shall take from Husserl that the self-organizing codes of the 
communication at level C are not material, but belong to our reality as structures of expectations 
or res cogitans. Popper (1972) denoted this domain as World 3, but neither he nor Husserl 
                                                 
7
 Husserl uses the singular form “cogitatum” for this intersubjective intentionality. Note that for Descartes, the 
cogitatum was God, whom the contingent Cogito knows as the transcendent Other. 
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specified the evolutionary dynamics of expectations in terms of communications (Luhmann, 
1986b).  
 
We submit that res cogitans can be expected to develop in terms of redundancies instead of 
probabilistic entropy, unlike the material world (res extensa) where the Second Law prevails. 
Language and the symbolic media of communication enable us to multiply meanings as options 
at a speed much faster than can historically be realized. The codes of communications provide us 
with horizons of other possible meanings. The different codes can be recombined and 
reconstructed. We shall argue that at level B, meanings are instantiated in specific combinations 
of codes, while at level C the codes themselves are further developed in response to the temporal 
integrations in the instantiations. 
 
The development of redundancies 
 
As is well-known, Shannon’s (1948) probabilistic entropy (H) is coupled to Gibbs’ formula for 
thermodynamic entropy HkS B * . In Gibbs’ equation, kB is the Boltzmann constant that 
provides the dimensionality Joule/Kelvin to S, while H is dimensionless and can be measured in 
bits of information (or any other base of the logarithm) given a probability distribution 
(containing uncertainty). The Second Law of thermodynamics states that entropy increases with 
each operation, and Shannon-type information is accordingly always positive. 
 
The redundancy R is defined in information theory as the fraction of the capacity of a 
communication channel that is not used. In formula format:  
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max
max
max
1
H
HH
H
H
R



 (1) 
 
Brooks & Wiley (1986) noted that in the case of an evolving (e.g., biological) system, the 
number of options N may increase, and therefore both the H of the system under study and the 
maximum entropy (Hmax) can increase (Hmax = log(N). In Figure 4a, we added green to the 
redundancy as part of the entropy: these are the options that were not realized by the system, but 
could have been realized. Kauffman (2000), for example, calls these possible realizations 
“adjacent,” but his argument remained in the biological domain. Above this area, however, 
Brooks & Wiley (1986, at p. 43) added the label “impossible” as a legend (Figure 4a). 
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Figure 4a: The development of entropy (Hobs), 
maximum entropy (Hmax), and redundancy 
(Hmax – Hobs). Source: Brooks & Wiley (1986, 
at p. 43). 
Figure 4b: Hitherto impossible options 
are made possible because of cultural 
and technological evolution. 
 
In Figure 4b, we have added the label “technologically made feasible” to this latter area in order 
to indicate how the generation of new options (and hence redundancy) can be enhanced by 
cultural evolution which includes the levels B and C. An intentional system operates by adding 
redundancy without necessarily adding information (as we argued above). The addition of 
information is likely—because of the coupling to historical time—but this newly added 
uncertainty is not a condition for the generation of redundancy. Symbolic generalization of the 
codes regulates the generation of redundancies from above, whereas Shannon entropy is 
continuously generated in the historical process from below. 
 
New options can be generated as mutual redundancy when two (or more) codes of 
communication are instantiated, as in the case of introducing a new technology in a market or 
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when writing an evidence-based report for a government agency. In this case, one needs text that 
can be read using the various codes involved, and thus one generates redundancies deliberately 
(Fujigaki & Leydesdorff, 2000). The redundancy observable in the green surfaces of Figure 4b is 
generated by the recombination of redundancy flows in res cogitans. Both the carrying agents 
(cogitantes) and the models entertained (cogitata) can provide options—under conditions to be 
specified—from which one selects in the instantiations. Let us now try to specify this process 
more precisely. 
 
The measurement of redundancy 
 
a. Redundancy in two dimensions 
 
We propose to specify mutual redundancy between systems in analogy to the concept of mutual 
information as specified in Shannon’s theory. In Figure 5, the overlap between two uncertainties 
in different variables is depicted as sets. The mutual information can then be formulated as 
follows:  
 
122112 HHHT   (2) 
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1 2 12
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Figure 5: Overlapping uncertainties in two variables x1 and x2. 
 
Note that the addition of entropies accords with the rules of set theory. But this changes when we 
consider the overlap as a redundancy to be appreciated twice. In addition to H1 and H2, the 
overlap contains redundancy as a surplus of information. We can thus define an “excess” 
information value Υ12 —equivalent to H12 but with the plus sign, since we do not correct for the 
duplication in the case of redundancies—as follows: 
 
𝑌12 = 𝐻1 + 𝐻2 + 𝑇12 =  𝐻12 + 2𝑇12 (3) 
  
The mutual redundancy R12 can now be found by using Y12 instead of H12 in Eq. 2, as follows:  
 
𝑅12 = 𝐻1 + 𝐻2 − 𝛶12  
        = 𝐻1 + 𝐻2 − (𝐻12 + 2𝑇12) 
= 𝐻1 + 𝐻2 − ([𝐻1 + 𝐻2 − 𝑇12] + 2𝑇12) 
= −𝑇12 (4) 
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Since T12 is necessarily positive (Theil, 1972: 59 ff.), it follows from Eq. 4 that R12 is negative 
and therefore cannot be anything other than the consequence of an increased redundancy. This 
reduction of the uncertainty is measured in bits of information, but the sign is negative. 
Therefore, this is not a Shannon-type information, since the latter information is necessarily 
positive (Krippendorff, 2009a).  
 
b. Redundancy in three and four dimensions 
 
For the three-dimensional case and using Figure 6, one can define, in addition to the two-
dimensional values of Υ (in Eq. 3), a three-dimensional value including the redundancy as 
follows: 
 
𝛶123 = 𝐻1 + 𝐻2 + 𝐻3 + 𝑇12 + 𝑇13 + 𝑇23 + 𝑇123 (5)  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Overlapping uncertainties in three variables x1, x2, and x3:  
two configurations with opposite sign of T123. 
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Information-theoretically, however, one derives the following corrections for the overlaps by 
subtracting in Figure 6: 
 
𝐻123 = 𝐻1 + 𝐻2 + 𝐻3 − 𝑇12 − 𝑇13 − 𝑇23 + 𝑇123 (6) 
 
It follows that the difference between Eqs. 5 and 6 (after subtraction) is:  
 
𝛶123 − 𝐻123 = +2𝑇12 + 2𝑇13 + 2𝑇23 
𝛶123 = 𝐻123 + 2𝑇12 + 2𝑇13 + 2𝑇23  (7) 
 
Furthermore, the mutual information in three dimensions can be derived (e.g., Abramson, 1963, 
at p. 129; cf. McGill, 1954; Yeung, 2008) as:  
 
𝑇123 = 𝐻1 + 𝐻2 + 𝐻3 − 𝐻12 − 𝐻13 − 𝐻23 + 𝐻123 (8) 
 
Using Υ-values instead of H-values for the joint entropies in Eq. 8, one obtains the mutual 
redundancy as follows:  
 
𝑅123 = 𝐻1 + 𝐻2 + 𝐻3 − (𝐻12 + 2𝑇12) − (𝐻13 + 2𝑇13) − (𝐻23 + 2𝑇23) 
+ (𝐻123 + 2𝑇12 + 2𝑇13 + 2𝑇23) 
= 𝑇123 (9) 
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In the three-dimensional case, the mutual redundancy is thus identical to the mutual information 
in three dimensions. Leydesdorff & Ivanova (2014, at p. 392) show that in the case of four 
dimensions R1234 = – T1234. The sign of the mutual redundancy alternates with the number of 
dimensions. This corrects for the otherwise inexplicable sign changes in the mutual information 
with increasing dimensionality. In other words, mutual redundancy in three or more dimensions 
is consistent, while mutual information itself is not, because of the sign changes with the 
dimensionality.
8
  
 
c. Generalization 
 
Eq. 8 can also be written as follows:  
 
T123 = [T12 + T13 + T23] + [H123 - H1 - H2 - H3] (10) 
 
since one can rewrite, as follows: 
  
T123 = [(H1 + H2 - H12) + (H1 + H3 - H13) + (H2 + H3 – H23)] + [H123 - H1 - H2 - H3]  
T123 = H1 + H2 + H3 - H12 - H13 - H23 + H123 (8) 
 
                                                 
8
 Krippendorff (2009b, at p. 670) provided a general notation for this alteration with changing dimensionality—but 
with the opposite sign (which further complicate the issue; cf. Leydesdorff, 2010a:68)—as follows: 
 
𝑄(Γ) = ∑ (−1)1+ |Γ|−|𝑋|𝐻(𝑋)𝑋⊆Γ  (9) 
 
In this equation, Γ is the set of variables of which X is a subset, and H(X) is the uncertainty of the distribution; |Γ| is 
the cardinality of Γ, and |X| the cardinality of X. 
28 
Due to the subadditivity property (because of overlaps as in Figure 6): 𝐻(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛)  ≤
∑ 𝐻(𝑥𝑖
𝑛
1 ), which holds for any dimension n≥ 2. The second bracket in Eq. 10 makes a negative 
contribution, whereas the terms in the first bracket of Eq. 10 are strictly positive.  
 
It follows (inductively) that for any given dimension n, one can formulate combinations of 
mutual informations corresponding to ∑ 𝐻(𝑥𝑖
𝑛
1 ) − 𝐻(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) that are by definition positive 
(or zero in the null case of complete independence). For example (up to four dimensions) as 
follows: 
 
0 ≤ ∑ 𝐻(𝑥𝑖
𝑛=2
𝑖=1 ) − 𝐻(𝑥1, 𝑥2) =  𝑇12  
0 ≤ ∑ 𝐻(𝑥𝑖
𝑛=3
𝑖=1 ) − 𝐻(𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3) =  ∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗
3
𝑖𝑗 − 𝑇123 (11) 
0 ≤ ∑ 𝐻(𝑥𝑖
𝑛=4
𝑖=1 ) − 𝐻(𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑥4) = ∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗
6
𝑖𝑗 − ∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑘
4
𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝑇1234  
 
where the sums on the right-hand side are over the (𝑛
𝑘
) permutations of the indices. This relation 
can be extended for general n as, 
 
0 ≤ ∑ 𝐻(𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) − 𝐻(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛)   
    = ∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗
(𝑛2)
𝑖𝑗 − ∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑘
(𝑛3)
𝑖𝑗𝑘 + ∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 − ⋯+ (−1)
1+𝑛 (
𝑛
4)
𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙
∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙…(𝑛−1)
( 𝑛𝑛−1)
𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙…(𝑛−1)
+
         (−1)𝑛 ∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙...(𝑛)
(𝑛𝑛)
𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙…(𝑛)
 (12) 
  
where the last term on the right-hand side is equal to (−1)𝑛 𝑇1234...𝑛. Returning to the relation 
between 𝑅12 and 𝑇12, it now follows instructively that:  
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𝑅12 = − 𝑇12 
 = 𝐻(𝑥1, 𝑥2) − ∑ 𝐻(𝑥𝑖
2
1 ) ≤ 0  (11) 
 
and the analogous relations for 𝑅123 and 𝑅1234 follow in the same way from Eq. (12). More 
generally, in the case of more than two dimension, n > 2: 
 
𝑅𝑛 = (−1)
1+𝑛 𝑇1234…𝑛 = [𝐻(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) − ∑ 𝐻(𝑥𝑖
𝑛
1 )]  
+ [∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗
(𝑛2)
𝑖𝑗 − ∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑘
(𝑛3)
𝑖𝑗𝑘 + ∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 − ⋯+ (−1)
1+𝑛 (
𝑛
4)
𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙
∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙...(𝑛−1)
( 𝑛𝑛−1)
𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙…(𝑛−1)
] (13) 
 
The left-bracketed term of Eq. 13 is necessarily negative entropy, while the configuration of the 
remaining mutual information relations contribute a second term on the right which is positive 
(see the set of Equations 11 above). In other words, we model here the generation of redundancy 
on the one side versus the historical process of relating on the other, as an empirical balance. 
When the resulting R is negative, self-organization prevails over organization in the 
configuration under study, whereas a positive R indicates conversely a predominance of 
organization over self-organization as two different subdynamics. 
 
Note that the resulting configuration of relations—as expressed in the right-hand term of Eq. 
13—no longer refers to level A of the Shannon model because this formulation implies a systems 
view, whereas the Shannon model focuses on local relations. (As noted, a negative value of R12 
cannot be appreciated in the Shannon model.) In other words, the right-side term of Eq. 13 is 
composed of both interactional and correlational information, and the resulting sign and value of 
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R thus include also the feed-forward and feedback loops between levels A and B. The one sign of 
R can also be associated with clockwise and the other with anti-clockwise rotation of the 
resulting vectors, whereas the values of the two terms in Eq. 13 measure the relative weights of 
the two rotations. 
 
Clockwise and anti-clockwise rotations 
 
As soon as the relation between two subdynamics (or agents) is extended with a third, the third 
may feedback or feed-forward on the communication relation between the two, and thus a 
system is shaped (Sun & Negishi, 2010). This principle is known in social network analysis as 
“triadic closure” (Bianconi et al., 2014; De Nooy & Leydesdorff, 2015). Triadic closure can be 
considered as the basic mechanism of systems formation. When three selection environments 
operate on variation in the interactions among them, the communication can proliferate auto-
catalytically using each third mechanism as a feedback on or feed-forward to bi-lateral relations. 
At a next moment, the cycling may take control as a vortex. 
 
Ulanowicz (2009 at p. 1888) depicted this possibility of auto-catalysis as follows:  
 
 
Figure 7: Schematic of a hypothetical three-component autocatalytic cycle.  
(Source: Ulanowicz, 2009, at p. 1888, Figure 3.)  
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A second cycle with the reverse order of the operations is equally possible; the two cycles can be 
modeled as two vectors, and this system can then be simulated in terms of rotations of the 
vectors. One vector can be understood as corresponding to the tendency of historical realization 
and the other to self-organization. Using simulations, Ivanova & Leydesdorff (2014a and b) 
showed that the operation of these two three-dimensional vectors upon each other generates a 
value of R depending on the configuration. As we showed above, R can also be measured. This 
measure indicates the size of the footprint of the self-organizing fluxes of communication on the 
historical organization in the instantiation.  
 
The cycles can be vicious or virtuous in the sense of providing opportunities for next-order 
systems formation. The horizontal circulation provides a subdynamics analytically different from 
the vertical dynamics, but the two dynamics influence each other as they provide one another 
with variation. For example, the system is constructed bottom-up in terms of triadic closures.
9
 In 
these triads, the order of the operations matters because the circulation across the communication 
field can become increasingly an independent factor in the further dynamics. The emergence of a 
communication field in the circulation from the interactions leads to new non-linear interactions. 
In other words, the probabilistic entropy is extended with one more degree of freedom by the 
shaping of this field or, in other words, a new code becomes possible. The number of 
                                                 
9
 In the case of communication between two components, the symmetry is commutative or Abelian in terms of 
gauge theory. Addition of the third component changes the symmetry in the group to non-Abelian (non-
commutative). Transformations in a non-Abelian group lead to the appearance of further interactions because the 
field generated by the interactions can itself become another source of interactions (Yang & Mills, 1954).  
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combinatorial options among codes is based on the multiplication of the numbers of categories in 
the respective code sets. Note that the operation of triadic closure is recursive. 
 
The “Method of Reflections” between codes of communication 
 
A perspective for further research is provided by applying Hidalgo & Hausmann’s (2009) 
“Method of Reflections” between codes to the horizons of meaning implicated at level C. Each 
horizon of meaning can be considered as a code set or alphabet; two code sets can co-evolve. In 
their study of economic complexity, these authors proposed the following recursive equations for 
a model of how code sets reflect each other when co-evolving:  
 
𝑘𝑝,𝑛 =
1
𝑘𝑝,0
∑ 𝑀𝑐,𝑝𝑘𝑐,𝑛−1
𝑁𝑐
𝑐=1
𝑘𝑐,𝑛 =
1
𝑘𝑐,0
∑ 𝑀𝑐,𝑝𝑘𝑝,𝑛−1
𝑁𝑝
𝑝=1
 (14) 
 
In Eq. 14, pj represents the set of product groups and cj the set of countries; Mc,p is the 
asymmetrical matrix of countries versus product groups; kp,n and kc,n denote row and column 
vectors of this matrix at the n
th
 iteration.  
 
In a number of analytical steps, one can derive from these equations an economic complexity 
index (ECI) of countries in terms of their product portfolios, and vice versa an index of product 
complexity (PCI) in comparison to other countries. Using this “Method of Reflections,” the one 
codification is reflected asymmetrically in the other (Kemp-Benedict, 2014). In principle, the 
reflections can be extended to more than two sets; for example, three code sets can be reflected 
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into each other asymmetrically with six different translations among codes as a result (Ivanova et 
al., 2015). 
 
The co-evolution of code sets modeled in Eqs. 14 can be expected to converge when one uses 
averages in the equations (Ourens, 2013). In this case, the one code set can be precisely 
translated into the other. In the case of communications, however, one expects highly skewed 
distributions (Ijiri & Simon, 1977; Seglen, 1992) and thus the translations among code sets—
operationalized here as reflections—will remain uncertain. The more complex each code (that is, 
as a character in an alphabet of categories),
10
 the more uncertain its meaning.  
 
Importantly, it can be shown that a co-evolution between code sets transforms them to the extent 
that the observable input 𝑘𝑝,0 = ∑ 𝑀𝑐,𝑝
𝑁𝑐
𝑐=1  stands orthogonally to the output vector ?⃗?  after 
sufficient iterations (Kemp-Benedict, 2014, Appendix I, at pp. 12f.). In other words, the 
reflections among the self-organizing codes can completely transform the observable 
configurations. Code sets (“alphabets”) are self-generated as communication channels by the 
transformations. As noted, the addition of a new code set multiplies the number of options and 
thus increases the sustainability of the more diversified system (Leydesdorff, 1997, pp. 335f.). 
 
Summary and conclusions 
 
We have extended Shannon’s model of communication (at level A) with two levels (B and C) 
that change the linear model into an evolutionary one because feedback and feed-forward loops 
                                                 
10
 The codes can also be considered as indicating a hierarchy such as the different branches of the Medical Subject 
Headings (MeSH) in MEDLINE/PubMed (Petersen et al., under submission). 
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are possible among the levels. At level A, information is transmitted; at level B, information is 
organized and thus made meaningful in a vector-space. Reflexivity reveals that this vector space 
is constructed and therefore a potential subject of reconstruction: the possibility of reconstruction 
opens horizons of meaning (level C). These horizons can be expected to originate along the 
eigenvectors of the communication matrix. Whereas the common language at level B tends to 
integration (into organization), the eigenvectors can be expected to span a vector space in 
different directions. Thus, this layer generates horizontal differentiation as a top-down pressure.  
 
Codes of communication are no longer actor-attributes, but operate on the communications once 
they emerged in a self-organizing mode, that is, insofar as constraints on the communication are 
removed. The system has to find these resonances by varying historically. That can be a long and 
tedious process such as, for example, the invention of modernity since the late Middle Ages. 
New coordination mechanisms with specific codes are “invented” and added one by one. For 
example, the power of the Pope at the Vatican eventually assumed a sanctified meaning in the 
Middle Ages (“Roma dixit”), but this hierarchy became contested during the Struggle for the 
Investiture (11
th
 and 12
th
 centuries), the Reformation (16
th
 century), etc. The invention of the 
printing press (15
th
 century) made it possible to disseminate ideas, wishes, fantasies, etc., at an 
increasing speed. Sufficient volumes of variation may be needed to find resonances with next-
order potentials.  
 
The specification of the selection mechanisms is crucial in the cultural domain. “What is 
evolving?” becomes a relevant question when selection is no longer given by nature (Andersen, 
1994). Boulding (1978, p. 33) answered this question at the time by formulating: “What evolves 
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is something very much like knowledge.” From our perspective, we consider “knowledge” as 
codified meaning. The codes of communication are evolving in a self-organization process of 
variously codified meanings. Note that meaning can also be codified in other directions, such as 
the meaning of communications in political discourse, etc.  
 
In addition to vertical differentiation, the assumption of horizontal differentiation is needed for 
understanding the evolving complexity. By being coded, some meanings can assume 
performative roles more than others; for example in the case of legislation. The differentiation 
and the ensuing pluriformity of the competing coordination mechanisms, however, break the 
structural formations so that the systems can be expected to grow by being interrupted. The 
generation pf redundancy can thus enter the historical instantiations and under the condition of 
self-reinforcing loops tip the balance towards the prevalence of evolutionary self-organization 
over historical organization. We have shown how this trade-off can be followed by the 
measurement of mutual redundancies. 
 
We argue that redundancy is a more crucial subject of study in a knowledge-based economy than 
information. Redundancies are not generated on the side of the variation, but by the selection 
mechanisms operating upon one another. When three or more selection mechanisms operate, 
auto-catalysis is an option, and options can then be generated at an increasing pace. Thus, 
horizontal differentiation is a necessary component of self-organization in the vertical dimension. 
The warp and the woof of meaning generation and self-organization are not harmoniously 
integrated as in textiles, but differentiated and disturbing one another. These dynamics lead to a 
fractal manifold in different directions. Through breakage new options are generated.  
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The generation of redundancy proceeds in a domain that reflexively can be assumed to exist. 
Derivates of the Latin frangere such as fragments, fragile, fractals, etc.,  may help to indicate 
that—as against res extensa— res cogitans does not “exist” in the sense of Latin esse 
(Heidegger, 1962). By turning away from an objectivistic self-understanding of the sciences, we 
find room for a general theory of meaning and knowledge-generation that we have depicted as an 
extension of Shannon’s theory (Figure 3), but which can also be understood as this theory’s 
proper intension. As we argued, meaning is not “added” to the information as uncertainty, but 
provided by constructing new and richer perspectives. 
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